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MEMORANDUM FOR:	ADCI		tive Registry	
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I have not se	ent a copy to A	dmiral Tuņ	ner, but y	ou 🔝
may wish to cons	ider it.			
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	Richa	rd Lehman		
	- D/D	CI/NI		
#		Date 16	February	1977

THE HERSTEN FOR December 1

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16 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Harold Brown, 15 February 1977

- 1. I met with Secretary of Defense Brown in what is presumed to be the first of a series of regular meetings with him and Deputy Secretary Duncan. The latter was not present but Admiral Holcomb and another assistant were except for the last item.
- 2. I told Dr. Brown that I hoped we would be able to provide him with a window into what was going on in the intelligence business, and to get from him any guidance he wished to give to make our product more responsive to his needs. I looked on this as experimental and hoped by trial and error to arrive at the format that best suited him. I then covered the following:
 - -- The activities we were undertaking in the aftermath of 11-3/8, 11-4, and the Pipes Report. I told him that the KIQ strategy rising our of 11-4 would seek answers to some question but that I was realistic about what could be achieved in this area. In any case, our objective was to avoid future polarization of the Community on this issue. Finally, I noted that we wanted to review the whole structure of military estimates this year but thought it would be better to wait until the new administration's needs were better defined and particularly until the PRM 10 exercise was clarified.

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- -- I then spoke briefly about the warning estimate and showed him the terms of reference. Here, too, we needed time to work with the scenarios carefully. Dr. Brown at this point made an interesting suggestion. He said that if we had to bring outsiders of extreme view into the process, we might consider using them to define certain scenarios which the Community would then subject to analysis.
- 3. After asking the two assistants to leave the room, I gave Dr. Brown two sensitive reports from last year to read. These were ones of considerable interest that had come out before he took office. I also showed him one passage in another sensitive series, largely to ensure that he knew the series existed.
- 4. Dr. Brown wound up by saying that he had found the time useful and he looked forward to continuing the series.

Richard Lehman

Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

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